The bad news is that the digital access divide is here to stay: Domestically installed bandwidths among 172 countries for 1986–2014 by Hilbert, Martin
1 
 
The bad news is that the digital access divide is here to stay: 
domestically installed bandwidths among 172 countries for 1986 – 2014  
Martin Hilbert, University of California, Davis 
 
Author’s version published as Hilbert, M. (2016). The bad news is that the digital access divide is here to stay: 




 The digital divide measured in terms of bandwidth it not closing 
 Inequality fluctuates up- and down with technological progress and diffusion  
 Asia increased its global share in installed bandwidth from 23 to 51 % in 30 years 
 Bandwidth inequality is closely linked to income, which is notoriously unequal 
 It is urgent to start measuring bandwidth, not merely counting subscriptions 
Abstract 
In contrary to the common argument that the digital access divide is quickly closing and that the focus 
should shift to skills and usage, this article shows that access to digital communication is a moving target 
unlikely to ever be solved. While the number of subscriptions reaches population saturation levels, the 
bandwidth divide continuous to be dynamic. The article measures the nationally installed bandwidth 
potential of 172 countries from 1986 to 2014. The overarching finding is that the divide in terms of 
bandwidth does not show any clear monotonic pattern. It fluctuates up and down over the decades as the 
result of an intricate interplay between incessant technological progress and diffusion of technology. The 
bandwidth divide between high- and low income countries has first increased and only decreased below 
historic levels very recently during 2012-2014. In general it shows that the bandwidth divide is linked to 
the income divide, which is notoriously persistent. The bandwidth distribution among all countries is 
undergoing a new process of global concentration, during which North America and Europe is being 
replaced by Asia as the new global leader. In 2014 only 3 countries host 50 % of the globally installed 
bandwidth potential (10 countries almost 75 %). The U.S. lost its global leadership in 2011, being replaced 
by China, which contributes more than twice as much national bandwidth potential in 2014 (29 % versus 
13 %). Despite this bad news about the continuous persistence of the digital access divide among countries, 
exploratory analysis from a global perspective brings the good news that many more individual people 
seem to enjoy more equal access to global bandwidth. All of this showcases the urgency to systematically 




1. Introduction  
The article takes inventory of the evolution of the international telecommunication infrastructure in 
terms of the installed telecommunication bandwidth capacity between 1986 and 2014. This matters both 
because of the importance of digital technologies throughout the world and the continuous evolution of 
telecommunication. Telecommunication access solution have evolved significantly during the past three 
decades, consisting exclusively of fixed-line telephony in the late 1980s, and a plethora of access solution 
with diverse performance levels. Over the last decade, the literature has increasingly pointed to the 
importance of bandwidth and especially broadband metrics, which have shown to have important socio-
economic benefits (Dutton et al., 2004; Koutroumpis, 2009; Prieger, 2013; Gruber et al., 2014; Lee et al., 
2015). Quantifying the digital divide in terms of subscriptions might not be sufficient anymore, as not all 
subscriptions are equal. In light of this, the key question of this article is if technological progress has 
rendered traditional metrics of the digital divide obsolete.  
 
1.1. From subscriptions to bandwidth 
Traditionally the international digital divide is assessed in terms of telecommunication subscriptions 
(NTIA, 1995; OECD, 2001; ITU, 2015). On the international level, the most common go-to source are the 
statistics from United Nations’ International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2014). ITU has undertaken 
a sustained effort over several decades to collect this data from administrative registries of national 
telecommunication authorities in a harmonized manner. These same databases have shown that the number 
of mobile and fixed telecom subscriptions per person are increasingly reaching a certain level of global 
saturation, including 6.8 billion mobile phone subscriptions worldwide for 7.0 billion people in 2014.  
Since there seems to be a certain limit in how many technological devices a person handles (Hilbert, 
2014a), any analysis that uses the number of subscriptions as a proxy for the digital divide must come to 
the conclusion that the divide is closing over time. As early as the year 2000, this perspective has led to the 
impression that “the gaps are rapidly closing” (Compaine, 2001). Over the years, this view has become as 
engrained into the way of looking at the digital divide that is has become natural to assume a national 
“carrying capacity of Internet users” (e.g. Neokosmidis, et al., 2015). Once this carrying capacity is reached 
(once everybody has reached the limit of how many subscriptions can be handled), saturation sets in and 
the divide can only close. As a result, new technological solutions might create new divides, but in terms 
of their numbers the divide will always be closing over time, as it has happened with computer access, 
mobile phones, or broadband adoption (e.g. Vicente & López, 2011; Loo & Ngan, 2012; Prieger, 2013).  
Based on this impression, scholars have long moved on to work on the digital divide in terms of 
differential usage patterns, caused by differences in skills, culture and other demographics and social 
variables (Mossberger et al., 2003; Warschauer, 2004; van Dijk, 2005; Vicente & López, 2011; Deursen & 
van Dijk, 2014). This sometimes referred to as the “second-level digital divide” (Hargittai, 2002; Büchi et 
al., 2015). In more advanced countries, the dimension of physical access has become a question of 
technology maintenance to sustain the level of subscriptions and devices (Gonzalez, 2015). 
However, the fact that the number of telecom subscriptions per person seems limited and will eventually 
reach saturation levels does not automatically imply that inequality in terms of access to digitalized 
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information is reducing as well. This is because bandwidth is not uniformly distributed among 
subscriptions. Figure 1a shows this distinction was not relevant only a few decades ago. The late 1980s 
exhibited a linear one-to-one relationship between subscriptions and bandwidth, as there was only fixed 
line telephony around, all with the same bandwidth. Today’s digital infrastructure offers a myriad of 
different bandwidth options, which leads to an L-shaped non-linear relationship exhibit in Figure 1b. The 
Figure shows that ICT diffusion seems to hit an invisible wall at around 2-3 subscriptions per person. 
However, the digital divide continues at this point, just along a new dimension: the bandwidth dimension.  
“This implies that we have now moved into a second, more mature, and also more persistent stage of 
the digital divide” (Hilbert, 2014c). The first phase consisted of a universalization of the required 
technological infrastructure. The second stage consists of an endlessly evolving inequality of bandwidth. 
While today almost everybody in the world counts with a minimum level of connectivity potential through 
a digital mobile phone, some have access to significantly more bandwidth. Figure 1b suggests that there 
might not be a clear “carrying capacity” in terms of the bandwidth per subscription and therefore also not 
automatically any level of saturation that would inevitably close the digital divide. The answer to the 
connectivity question moves from being a binary black-or-white choice (0 - 1) to a continuous and 
incessantly moving grey zone (1 - ∞).  
 
Figure 1. Subscriptions per capita (fixed and mobile) vs. kbps per capita (voice and data in optimally 
compressed kbps of installed bandwidth potential). N = 100 countries. Size of bubbles: log population. (a) 
1986 (b) 2013.  
1.2. So what? 
This second stage of the digital access divide becomes extremely relevant in times where fast bandwidth 
solutions have become to take center stage in the discussion about social growth and progress (Dutton et 
al., 2004; Koutroumpis, 2009; Prieger, 2013; Gruber et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015). Bandwidth matters 




social-, cultural-, political-, and economic development (Manyika et al., 2011; Hilbert, 2016). Better 
understanding the bandwidth divide is also important in order to better frame the ongoing debate about net-
neutrality, which centers on the question of creating a tiered internet (Krämer et al. 2013, Hsu, 2014). As it 
stands, we do not have much insight into internet bandwidth distribution. With or without net-neutrality, it 
might well be that even without any kind of intervention into traffic patterns, plain differences in physical 
infrastructure availability around the world have already created a de-facto tiered structure among some 
with much and some with systematically little bandwidth: a digital bandwidth divide.  
Despite these reasons, research continues to disregard this reality and still refers to the number of 
telecom subscription, especially for large-scale international statistical tests (for example Pick & Sarkar, 
2015; Mardikyan et al., 2015; Mendonça et al., 2015). This seems to have less to do with the fact that 
scholars are not aware, but that subscriptions data is readily available, and bandwidth and traffic data is not. 
Reminiscent of the famous drunk who is looking for the lost keys under a well-lit lamppost far away from 
the dark site where the keys were dropped, international analysts continue to recur to the readily available 
and harmonized databases on subscriptions. 
Changing this current practice faces two challenges. One the one hand, important efforts are currently 
underway to explore new ways to measure relevant aspects of this second stage of the digital divide. 
Leading authorities like the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC, 2014) or Ofcom (2014) in 
the UK have started to produce detailed annual reports at the national level. These efforts are struggling 
with finding adequate new metrics. For example the first generation of broadband reports of the FCC from 
the early 2000 distinguished between access solution below and above 200 kbps (FCC, 2000). A second 
generation of reports recognized that “existing definitions are not static” (FCC, 2004), and let to definitions 
which seem equally temporal in nature, such as distinctions between 200kbps – 2.5 mbps, 2.5 – 10 mbps, 
10 – 25 mbps, 25 – 100 mbps (FCC, 2008); or more fine-tuned specifications, which seem as arbitrary as 
provisional, such as recommendations to measure download/upload ratios at 384 kbps/1.5 kbps and 3 
Mbps/768 kbps (FCC, 2012); or later assessments of ratios such as 10 Mbps/1 Mbps and 25 Mbps /3 Mbps 
(FCC, 2015).1 Given the lack of a universal metric, it is natural that researchers from academia have started 
to explore a combination of metrics from private and public sector sources to evaluate the implications of 
the diverse bandwidth landscape for growth and competition (e.g. Lehr et al., 2011; Libenau et al., 2013). 
These efforts usually go deep and explore different aspects, but are at the same time usually 
demographically limited in scope and in the analyzed timespan, since globally harmonized long term time 
series are not available for more detailed metrics. 
On the other hand, the challenge consists in showing why we should care globally about this new 
dimension of the digital divide. Rather than exploring detailed metrics, these kind of studies ask why is it 
important to undertake a sustained effort to produce, harmonize and analyze the global evolution of 
bandwidth (e.g. Vicente & Gil-de-Bernabé, 2010; Hilbert & López, 2011; Riddlesden & Singleton, 2014; 
Gruber et al., 2014). This present article falls into this second group of research. As such, the article works 
with a rather rudimentary proxy for bandwidth, but is able to cast a wide global net to show a rough outline 
                                                 
1 These numbers are often the outcome of a political process, including private sector lobbying influence, e.g. see 
footnote 133 in FCC (2012).   
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of ongoing dynamics for 172 countries2, corresponding to 96 % of the world’s population and 99 % of the 
world’s Gross National Income (GNI). The analyzed time series captures 29 years, which covers the entire 
transition from almost inexistent digitalization (less than 1 % of the global information stockpile was digital 
in 1986), to the full-blown digital age with almost all of it in digital format (Hilbert & López, 2011).  
 
2. Methodology: a statistical challenge 
Much in line with Figure 1, our two most important indicators refer to the number of subscriptions on 
the one hand, and bandwidth capacity on the other. The undertaking of creating global time series data faces 
two main statistical challenges, one related to the creation of national statistics among many countries (in 
space) and the other one to the creation of normalized time series (in time). 
  
2.1. Installed national bandwidth potential 
The creation of national bandwidth statistics requires three main inputs: the number of 
telecommunication subscriptions (fixed and mobile); the kind of access technology per subscription (like 
DSL, GSM, etc); and the corresponding bandwidth per access technology.  
The first two are provided mainly by the well-known database of ITU (2014), which we complement 
with other sources for a variety of data gaps (especially for the diffusion of fiber optics and wearables and 
tablets3. We include analog and digital fixed-line telephony; fixed-line internet in the form of dial-up, ISDN 
(Integrated Services Digital Network), DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), Satellite broadband, Cable modem 
and FTTH/B (Fiber to the Home/Business); 1G, 2G, 2.5G, 3G and 4G mobile telephony (voice and data); 
and tablets and wearables (see Supplementary Material).  This already provides us with one of our main 
indicators: the number of subscriptions. For reasons of simplicity, we will often work with the total 
number of subscription by adding them all up (neglecting differences in terms of their fixed or mobile 
nature, and their underlying technology). This does not mean that more fine-grained analysis is not possible 
(the total is built on the before-mentioned technology rubrics, see Figure 2a), but it most often aims at 
keeping things simple. 
                                                 
2 Following 3 letter ISO code: KOR, HK, DNK, JPN, SGP, MAC, NLD, SWE, FIN, CHE, NOR, LTU, USA, GBR, 
TWN, CAN, BEL, FRA, ESP, DEU, RUS, PRT, AUS, MDA, EST, NZL, CZE, BGR, SVN, HUN, POL, SVK, ISR, 
ITA, URY, UKR, GRC, CHN, KAZ, SAU, AZE, THA, CHL, TUR, BRA, PRI, MNG, MEX, MYS, ARG, ECU, 
JOR, DOM, PAN, JAM, MUS, CRI, COL, KGZ, VNM, GHA, ZAF, EGY, NAM, ZWE, IDN, TUN, SLV, NPL, 
PHL, GTM, PER, VEN, SEN, BOL, PRY, MLI, HND, NIC, IRN, NGA, DZA, UZB, TJK, CIV, IND, KEN, SWZ, 
PAK, YEM, RWA, CMR, BGD, TZA, MOZ, MWI, SLE, ETH, NER, ERI, ALB, AND, AGO, ATG, ARM, AUT, 
BHS, BHR, BRB, BLR, BLZ, BEN, BMU, BTN, BWA, BRN, BFA, BDI, CPV, CAF, TCD, COM, COG, COD, 
HRV, CYP, DJI, DMA, GNQ, FJI, GAB, GMB, GEO, GRL, GRD, GIN, GUY, ISL, IRL, KIR, KWT, LAO, LVA, 
LBN, LSO, LBR, LIE, LUX, MDG, MLT, MRT, MAR, OMN, PNG, ROU, KNA, LCA, WSM, SYC, LKA, VCT, 
SDN, SUR, SYR, TGO, TON, TTO, TKM, UGA, ARE, VUT, ZMB. 
3 For example through different regional networks of the Fiber-to-the-Home-Council: http://www.ftthcouncil.org; 
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu; http://www.ftthcouncilap.org; and Cisco Systems (2015) and Ericsson (2015) 
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Obtaining the corresponding bandwidth per access technology is trickier. Up until roughly 2006/2007, 
it was more straightforward to assign a certain bandwidth performance to a specific access technology. For 
example, a digital fixed-line phone provides a general (uncompressed) bandwidth of 64 kbps, an ISDN BRI 
internet modem 128 kbps, and the voice-transmission of a GSM mobile phone also 128 kbps. We use this 
strategy for more traditional technologies, like fixed phones, dial-up, ISDN and 2G/2.5G mobile telephony. 
After the introduction of global broadband solutions like DSL and cable modem, and 3G mobile telephony, 
the direct assignment of bandwidth to specific technologies becomes less viable.  
We chose to approximate the installed bandwidth by recurring to crowed-sourced data from bandwidth 
speedtests, which allows us to maintain a very wide geographical focus. Especially NetIndex (Ookla, 2014) 
has gathered the results of end-user-initiated bandwidth velocity tests per country per day since 01/01/2008. 
This crowd-source method results in very large samples. For example, an average of 179,822 tests per 
country per day were gathered in 2010 through Speedtest.net and Pingtest.net. The resulting database is 
seen as “the best of the currently available data sources for assessing the speed of ISP’s broadband access 
service” (Bauer et al., 2010). We consult both upload and download test and add both in our assessment of 
broadband capacity. We assume that the national average bandwidth test result from NetIndex for fixed 
broadband is the weighted mean of all nationally installed DSL, cable modem, and FTTH/B subscriptions. 
Likewise we assumed that the national average for mobile data from both NetIndex (Ookla, 2014) and 
Akamai (2014) is the result of 3G and 4G mobile phones. For details see Supplementary Material.  
The sum of the product of the number of subscriptions and their respective broadband performance 
provides a proxy for the installed national bandwidth potential. It is important to point out that this metric 
does not measure actual traffic flow, but works with the number the end user gets when performing an 
online speed test at a specific moment in time. This has shown to be significantly better than working with 
supply side metrics, which are often flawed as operators usually do not fulfill the promised bandwidth 
(European Commission, 2014). However, it still merely refers to an installed potential, as the result from a 
second-long speed test might deviate from hour-long downloads, and does not provide insights into how 
intensively the bandwidth is used (Hilbert & López, 2012b). In reality, the network in its entirety would 
collapse if all users would demand their installed bandwidth capacity simultaneously (or 24 hours a day). 
Previous work that compared the installed bandwidth potential with actual traffic flows found that “the 
average user only uses its promised full bandwidth for effectively nine minutes per day” (Hilbert & López, 
2012a). Users might sit in front of a computer for hours, but the full bandwidth is on average only filled 
with traffic during a much smaller proportion.  
Here we focus mainly on international comparisons, which makes it less relevant to ask if there is a flaw 
in the metric, but to ask if the flaw is different in different countries. For the purpose of international 
comparisons, both bandwidth potential and actual traffic would turn out equivalent if it were assumed that 
usage intensity within provided bandwidth would not differ among countries. This is of course not exactly 
true, as traffic prices, usage patterns and cultural habits differ among countries and can influence bandwidth 





2.2. Normalizing information time series 
The creation of meaningful time series for bandwidth capacities hinges on temporal normalization on 
technological progress in compression algorithms. Advancements in lossless compression allow to send the 
same amount of information with less binary symbols (in the sense of Shannon, 1948). Compression is 
omnipresent in the digital age and is at the core of solutions like GSM, CMDA, JPEG, MPEG, etc. The 
amount of information transmitted through the same hardware channel has been significantly increased 
through the ever more sophisticated use of compression algorithms. Previous estimates have shown that 
content compression has contributed with a compound annual growth rate of over 10 % to the global growth 
of the effectively telecommunicated traffic between 1986 and 2007 (compared with a 8 % contribution of 
infrastructure expansion and additional 7 % though better hardware) (Hilbert, 2014a). This shows that 
compression is an important driver of the global information explosion.  
Achievable compression rates vary significantly among different kinds of content, depending on the 
amount of redundancy in the source. For example, video content is usually more compressible than 
alphanumeric text. Therefore, the creation of the average compression rates at certain points in time requires 
two main inputs: the kind of content flowing through fixed and mobile network; and achievable 
compression rates for different kinds of content. We estimate the amount of content by distinguishing 
between text, images, audio and video, for fixed and mobile, upstream and downstream, according to five 
world regions (Sandvine, 2014; Cisco Systems, 2015). We estimate the corresponding average state of the 
art of compression rates per kind of content every seven years, for 1986, 1993, 2000, 2007 and 2014 and 
interpolate between them. This spacing gives enough room to identify the dominating compression 
technology at a given point in time (see Supporting Material). We also estimate the optimally achievable 
compression rate, which approximates the entropy of the source (Hilbert & López, 2012a).  
We take advantage of the unique role of the entropy of the source (following Shannon’s source coding 
theorem; Shannon, 1948) and use it as our anchor of normalization. We then normalize the content in time, 
acting as all content would always be optimally compressed. Since the entropy of the source is a constant 
and since today’s compression algorithms have gotten quite close to it, this gives us a stable ground to stand 
on while evaluating the incessantly moving technological frontier in compression. The result is reminiscent 
of what economists do when normalizing on inflation rates. It allows us to create meaningful time series 
that quantify comparable amounts of information through time, not merely the quantity of more or less 
efficiently compressed binary symbols (Hilbert & López, 2012a). The resulting unit of measurement are 
optimally compressed bits, which we represent as kilobits per second (kbps) for telecommunication 
solutions. 
This now finally provides us with our second main indicator: installed bandwidth potential, measured 
in optimally compressed kbps. This is our indicator for telecommunication capacity, which quantifies 
bandwidth. As with subscriptions, for reasons of simplicity, we will often work with the total sum of 
installed bandwidth potential, which does not mean that more fine-grained analysis would not be possible 




3. Results: bandwidth divides 
Figure 2 visualizes the source of the discrepancies between the tradition accounting of subscriptions, 
versus the accounting of bandwidth potential measured in optimally compressed kbps. Both, the accounting 
of subscriptions (Figure 2a) and bandwidth capacity (2b) evidence the elimination of the dominance of 
fixed line telephony, which was the 
dominating form of distance 
communication in the late 1980s. In 
terms of the number of technological 
devices, this dominance was clearly 
replaced by mobile telephony, especially 
narrowband 2G and 2.5G phones, and in 
more recent years, broadband smart 
phones. However, in terms of 
telecommunication capacity, it shows 
that fixed-line broadband plays the 
dominant role. Representing less than 9 
% of the world’s subscriptions, DSL, 
cable modem and fiber optics contribute 
57 % to the global bandwidth potential 
in 2014.  
 
Figure 2. Global shares of technologies 
(upload+download; fixed&mobile; 
voice&data): (a) subscriptions, (b) 
installed bandwidth potential, (c) 

















It is interesting to observe that the relation between subscriptions and bandwidth is neither linear, nor 
stable. For example, while we detect a monotonically4 increasing share of mobile phone subscriptions 
(Figure 2a), the contribution of mobile to global bandwidth is continuously fluctuating with incessant 
technological innovation, reaching some 37 % in both 2001 and 2011-2014, while falling to 16 % in 2007 
(Figure 2b). The increasing importance of mobile broadband in recent years is noticeable, representing 37 
% of the installed bandwidth potential, while contributing 29 % of global subscriptions. In this case, it is 
the number of subscriptions that contribute mass to the total. The most recent contributions of tablets and 
wearables show the potential to once again shift the picture of the global telecommunication landscape in 
the short-term future. Figure 2c shows the corresponding bandwidth averages per subscription. 
 
3.1. The divide between high- and low income regions 
Figure 3 looks at the global total in terms of global income groups (following the classification of the 
World Bank (2015)). The last three decades show a gradual loss of dominance of today’s high income 
countries. High income countries contributed some 85-86 % of the global subscriptions and installed 
bandwidth potential in 1986, but in 2013 merely 29 % of subscriptions (Figure 3a) and 58 % of bandwidth 
(Figure 3b). This also shows that global deconcentration in terms of subscriptions was twice as strong as in 
terms of bandwidth. Only four of the top-12 leading contributors to the worldwide stock of telecom 
subscriptions are high-income: China, India, U.S., Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Japan, Germany, Vietnam, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, and Mexico.  
Comparing these results with the global shares of population and Gross National Income (GNI) (Figure 
3c and 3d), it becomes clear that the diffusion dynamic of the number of subscriptions follows existing 
patterns in population distribution. Especially the diffusion of mobile phones during recent decades has 
contributed to the fact that both distributions have aligned in recent years. For example, upper middle 
income countries host 34 % of the world’s population and 37 % of telecom subscriptions. On the contrary, 
bandwidth rather follows the signature of economic capacities (Figures 3b and 3d). For example, in 2014 
lower middle income countries host 7 % of the world’s GNI and 7 % of global bandwidth potential. In 
short, subscriptions follow populations, while bandwidth follows income. This is worrisome, since the 
income divide is notoriously persistent. This shows that the digital divide in terms of data capacity is far 
from being closed, but is rather becoming a structural characteristic of modern societies, which could turn 
out to be as persistent as the existing income divide [Error! Bookmark not defined.]. 
 
                                                 
4 Monotonicity describes a quantity that varies in such a way that it either never decreases or never increases. 
10 
 
Figure 3: Global income regions: (a) subscriptions, (b) installed bandwidth potential, (c) population, (d) 
Gross National Income (GNI) (in current USD). 
 
Another interesting insight from Fig 3b is that the evolution of bandwidth is also not monotonic among 
countries. High income countries controlled a dominating share of 82 % in both 1993 and 2007, but their 
share was at 72 % in 2001 and 2011.  
This non-monotonicity4 becomes even more evident when analyzing these tendencies as per capita 
ratios. Figure 4 shows that in 2000 high income countries had 10 times more bandwidth per capita than 
lower income countries, which increased to a gap of 18:1 in 2007, to fell to 6:1 in 2014. The reason for this 
in fluctuating tendency of the divide in terms of bandwidth capacities is technological change combined 
with recurring patterns of unequal dynamic of technology diffusion. The increasing nature of the divide 
between 2000 and 2007 is due to the global introduction of broadband for fixed and mobile solutions. The 
most recent decreasing nature of the divide is evidence of the global diffusion of broadband. Every new 
technological innovation has the potential to increase the divide once again, as every innovation once again 
runs through the process of technology diffusion through social networks (Hilbert, 2011), which is never 
neither instantaneous, nor uniform, and therefore inevitably creates a divide. 
Figure 4 shows another very important fact. The divide continuously increases in absolute terms as 
technological progress increases bandwidth. In 2000, the average inhabitant of high income countries had 
access to an average of 50 kbps of installed bandwidth potential, while the average inhabitant of the rest of 
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the world had access to merely 5 kbps. In absolute terms, this results in a difference of some 45 kbps. This 
divide increased with an order of magnitude every 5 years, reaching almost 900 kbps in 2007, and over 
15,000 kbps by 2014. This increasing divide in absolute terms is important to notice in the context of a big 
data world, in which the amount of data is becoming a crucial ingredient for growth (Manyika et al., 2011; 
Hilbert, 2016). 
Figure 4: Bandwidth potential per capita; left-hand axis: avg. kbps per capita for high income countries 
and the rest of world; right-hand axis (dotted line): ratio of kbps/capita for high income countries divided 













3.2. The divide among countries 
We now focus on the trajectory of the divide among all 172 countries in our sample. We can use the 
well-known Gini metric of inequality to obtain a single number (Gini, 1921). The Gini coefficient is 
normalized between 0 (maximal equality) and 1 (maximal inequality). Figure 5 shows the Gini coefficient 
for the number of subscriptions per country, the installed bandwidth capacity per country (in optimally 
compressed kbps) and, for reasons of comparison, the Gross National Income (GNI) per country. Once 
again, we see clear evidence for a closing digital access divide in terms of subscriptions. We also evidence 
a quite monotonic tendency in terms of more equally distributed global income among countries. The divide 
in terms of installed bandwidth capacity, however, does not follow a clear monotonic pattern. The Gini 
coefficient has been as low as 0.866 (in 1994) and as high as 0.899 (in 2006). Most recently, during 2011-

















We can run the same analysis for the global inequality per capita. This means that we evaluate the 
trajectory of the number of subscriptions per capita and the installed kbps per capita. Figure 6 once again 
reveals a similarly monotonic pattern for the diffusion of devices, but a fluctuating pattern for bandwidth. 
As shown by the insert in Figure 6, there are just as many increasing as decreasing periods. 
 
















Both Figures seem to suggest that a new process of concentration of bandwidth potential has started 
among countries. The reason is the rise of Asia. As shown in Figure 7, Asia share of global bandwidth 
potential increased from 1 in 4 bits of bandwidth around 1990, to more than 1 in 2 bits by 2014. With 54 
%, Asia hosts more than half of globally installed bandwidth potential. Figure 7 shows that this leading role 
of Asian countries has undergone an internal change. In 2001, South Korea and Japan represented 16 % of 
global bandwidth potential, while Russia and China represented 15 %. By 2006, South Korea and Japan 
expanded its global share to 28 %, mainly driven by their early adoption of fiber optic broadband. Russia 
and China feel to 11 %. By 2014, the latter expanded their global share to 33 % (28% from China), while 
South Korea and Japan fell back to 16 %. This implies that together these four countries capture 49 % of 
the installed global bandwidth potential. 
 











Figure 8 shows evidence that especially the last few years some important rearrangements with regard 
to which countries lead the pack in the global bandwidth race. Back in 1986, a group of traditionally highly 
developed countries were found in the global top ranks. The U.S., Japan, France and Germany hosted more 
than half of global bandwidth. By the second half of the 1990s, China had started to join the top ranks, 
hosting 7 % of global bandwidth in 1996. During the second half of the 2000s, three Asian countries, Japan, 
South Korea and China occupied ranks 2, 3 and 4. The share of global bandwidth of the U.S. had almost 
shrunk to half its size from the late ‘80s by 2010, representing less than 15 %. At the same time, Russia had 
regained its position as an important player in terms of telecommunication capacity. The years 2010 was 
also the last year in which the U.S. ranked number 1. Stating in 2011 China has taken the global lead in 
terms of installed bandwidth capacity, hosting some 1.30 Petabits per second, versus 1.26 in the U.S.. By 
2014, China hosts almost twice as much bandwidth potential than the U.S.. 
It is interesting to notice that despite the profound reorganization within the ranking over the decades, 
the share of the top-10 countries has stayed surprisingly stable at 70 % of global bandwidth. This means 
that historically, a very small group of countries dominates global bandwidth. It is also interesting to notice 
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that the top-3 countries usually captured a share of about 40 – 45 %, but expanded its influence to 50 % in 
recent years. In 2014, only three countries contribute the globally installed bandwidth potential for every 
second telecommunicated bit of information.  
 
Figure 8: Top-10 of the installed bandwidth potential per country. 
 
3.3. The divide among people 
It would be very interesting to see how the bandwidth divide evolves among individuals. Although 
statistics on the individual ownership of ICT have significantly improved over the past decade (Katz & 
Rice, 2002; U.N. Partnership, 2008), there is still a significant lack of internationally harmonized statistics 
that include access to bandwidth. We are therefore forced to work with a model with certain assumption. 
Of course, “all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful” 
(Box and Draper, 1987; p.74). We will work with a model that aims at striking a middle ground in possible 
biases, and it turns out that it detects an important recent turn in events, which suggests that it might be 
useful.  
For this we create ‘hypothetical users’ and assign them different combinations of access solutions 
(Hilbert, 2014c). We assume that a person can maximally possess three different kinds of subscriptions 
(Internet, mobile phone, and fixed-line telephony5) and that the ‘most connected group’ of people possesses 
the highest performing subscriptions of all three kinds of technologies: the best available Internet 
subscription, the best available mobile phone, and a fixed-line phone. The second group of is defined as the 
group that has the next best performing set of subscriptions, which means that there are no more ‘best 
subscriptions’ of a certain kind available. It is replaced by the next highest performing subscription of the 
same kind subscriptions (Internet, mobile phone, or fixed phone), which defines the second group, and so 
forth. In other words, a group of users is defined by having the same three access solutions, and we stratify 
the entire population from a group with the best, down to a group with the least powerful access solutions 
worldwide. Users from the lower end can also own only two subscriptions, or one, or none at all.  
                                                 
5 We distinguish between two kinds of fixed phones: fixed phone analog & fixed phone digital; six kinds of Internet 
subscriptions: dial-up, ISDN, DSL, satellite, cable modem, FTTH/B; and four kinds of mobile access solutions: 
mobile voice only, mobile 2G/2.5G, tablets & wearables, mobile broadband. 
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The methodology behind this indicator is subject to two main biases. On the one hand, it can be biased 
toward more concentration than actually exists. In reality one person might possess only a mobile phone 
and no fixed phone; or a high-bandwidth internet connection but a low-bandwidth mobile phone, and so 
on. In this case, our assumption overestimates true inequality, as we force the highly connected to have the 
best of all three kinds. This bias increases in later years with the diversity of existing devices (the bias did 
not exist in the late 1980s at the time of exclusivity of uniformly performing fixed-line phones). On the 
other hand, it can be biased into the other direction toward less inequality than actually exists. In reality 
some users might possess multiple mobile phones, and have multiple internet subscriptions, etc. In this 
case, our assumption underestimates true inequality. Without further data on a global scale, we expect both 
biases to counteract on each other. 
Figure 9 once again uses the Gini coefficient to analyze the distribution of installed bandwidth capacity 
among the resulting groups. It shows that bandwidth potential inequality fluctuated during the 1990s and 
2000s, increasing and decreasing as a result of the interplay between technological innovation and diffusion. 
The good news is that recently, during the five years from 2009 – 2014, the digital divide among individuals 
in terms of bandwidth has finally started to decrease notably. The main driver of this fact is the global 
diffusion of fixed and mobile broadband, and a somewhat decelerating tendency of technological change 
(see the performance of mobile broadband and cable modem in Figure 1c since 2009). At the same time, 
we can once again notice a slight increase in inequality between 2013 and 2014. Considering the 
methodological limitations of the data, this might not necessarily mean much, but it warns us not to be 
overly hasty when extrapolating such tendencies for medium- and long-term projections.6  
Figure 9: Gini coefficients for 
the distribution of installed 
bandwidth potential among 









                                                 
6 Note that the chosen methodology here assumes an individual to accumulate up to 3 devices. This happens to result 
in the fact that there are about 7 billion users out of 7 billion people worldwide (using some 9 billion subscriptions). 
This implies some kind of breaking point in 2014 (following our assumption). In the future, the so-called internet of 
things (Atzori et al., 2010) and wearables could make it questionable to restrict the number of devices per person to 




Why do we see this important drop on a global level, while the analysis among countries in Figures 4, 
5 and 6 merely shows continuous fluctuations? Why the crude approach that leads to Fig. 9 cannot tell us 
much details, part of the reason is certainly revealed by the changing global ranking in Fig. 8. The rise of 
the world’s most populous country (i.e. China) leads to the fact that many more people worldwide have 
access to more bandwidth. Fig. 3b and 3c reveal that there is much room in this direction: globally installed 
bandwidth is by far not distributed in agreement with global population levels, but it shows that upper 
middle income countries have caught up significantly during reent years. This discrepancy between the 
international and individual levles underlines the significance of the lack of insight on the level of the 
individual, and emphazises the urgency to collect such metrics. 
 
3.4. Trajectories of bandwidth diffusion 
Last but not least, let us look at the evolution of the divide country level from a multidimensional 
perspective. Figure 10 adds the dimension of income per capita (GNI per capita) on a third axis of Figure 
1b. It suggests that countries move along the axis of subscriptions per capita quite independently of their 
income level. Rich and poor countries alike are found with up to 1.5 -2 subscriptions per capita. After 
having reached about 2 subscriptions per capita (roughly one fixed and one mobile solution), saturation sets 
in, regardless of income. However, the digital divide continues to evolve. In contrary to Figure 10c, no non-
linear L-shaped saturation logic can be detected when analyzing the relationship between kbps/capita and 
GNI/capita in Figure 10d. The relationship rather follows the trajectory of a diagonal linear one-to-one 
relationship between bandwidth and income. This reconfirms the previous finding that the digital bandwidth 
divide goes hand in hand with income, and therefore has the potential to become as persistent as the income 
divide. 
Of course, the insinuated correlations do not imply causation. However, some leads can be obtained 
from interesting outliers detectable in Figure 10. Countries like Switzerland (CHE), Norway (NOR) and 
Australia (AUS) have less bandwidth potential than their income level would suggest. The U.S. (USA), 
Canada (CAN), France (FRA) and Germany (DEU) also fall in this underperforming category. Others, like 
South Korea (KOR), Hong Kong (HK), Japan (JPN), Lithuania (LTU), Russia (RUS) and China (CHN) 
have more installed bandwidth that is to be expected with regard to their income. South Korea, Japan and 
Lithuania has long been identified as global best practices of government-led broadband role out (Kantei, 
2001; Rhee & Kim, 2004; Government of Lithuania, 2005. This leads to questions on how much bandwidth 




Figure 10: Different perspectives on three dimensions of the digital divide: subscriptions per capita; kbps 
per capita; GNI per capita. N = 100 countries for 2013. Size of bubbles: log population. 
  
4. Conclusions 
During the discussions about the right choice of indicators to monitor the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 (the “post-Millennium-Development-Goals”), two digital divide 
access indicators were discussed. The indicator “subscription to mobile cellular and/or fixed broad band 
internet” was evaluated as “feasible, suitable and very relevant (rating AAA)”, while the indicator “fixed 
and mobile broadband quality measured by mean download speed” was evaluated as “only feasible with 
strong effort, in need for further discussion and somewhat relevant” (UNSC, 2015). This article has shown 
that this “strong effort” will be inevitable, as measuring bandwidth quality has become very relevant 
already. This is because both technology diffusion and technological progress is rendering the number of 






divide in terms of subscriptions is rapidly closing, the digital divide in terms of bandwidth is rapidly 
evolving and here to stay. The article has shown that the digital divide in terms of bandwidth is actively 
evolving and showing lots of dynamics on the international level during recent years.  
The result is an ongoing divide as the result of an intricate interplay between continuous technological 
progress and recurrent processes of technological diffusion. Each technological innovation is associated 
with a new diffusion process. The divide will continue as long as technological progress continues. 
Economist refer to this process as “red queen effect”, which refers to a dynamic in which standing still 
means falling behind (it refers to the Red Queen in Alice’s Wonderland, who explains that one has to 
constantly run to simply stay in the same place). Technological progress in terms of bandwidth does not 
show any signs of slowing down. Once everybody is equipped with top-notch smartphones and fiber-optic 
connections, which is the technological frontier in 2014, others will have holograms and brain-computer-
interfaces, or some other kind of yet unpredictable product of the ceaseless creative destruction of 
technological innovation.  
This leads to many open questions on the research agenda. As stated at the outset, the idea behind this 
article is to showcase an argument, not to provide all-embracing solutions. One open challenge refers to the 
multiple causations and implications of bandwidth differentials. In this article we have frequently look at 
the relation to income levels. Income is traditionally the most pervasive indicator of development, which 
justifies this choice for a first exploration. We have seen that bandwidth potential is closely linked to income 
levels, and might therefore be subject to a similar persistency as global income inequality. At the same time 
the presented data has also aimed at clarifying the persistent claim that cost in telecom are falling so quick 
that economic wealth always becomes less of a factor. This argument has been made during the 1990s for 
narrowband internet, during the 2000s for mobile telephony, and during recent years for broadband. Several 
figures (including Fig. 3, Fig. 8, and Fig. 10) have shown that this argument does not hold on the 
international level. We cannot find evidence for this argument among countries. While this leads to 
important new discussions, income is not the only decisive factor. We have also seen deviations from the 
correlation with income. Analysis like the one in Fig. 10 can be done with many other additional indicators 
that give us a better understanding of the evolution of bandwidth.  
Another challenge refers to the generative mechanism of the detected “red queen” dynamic. The ensuing 
interplay between continuous progress and diffusion cycles is complex and affected by many factors. For 
some cases it has been shown that the resulting distribution among technological devices and their 
performance follows a power-law that arises as an interplay between exponential technological progress 
and exponential social diffusion (Hilbert, 2014b). Power-laws (or Pareto-distributions) are extremely 
skewed distributions, where exponentially few have exponentially much, and exponentially many, have 
exponentially little. In cases where this occurs, the divide follows a very predictable pattern: it is predictably 
and persistently extremely unequal.  
Last but not least, as stated in the outset, the speed-test metric used here has many flaws and limitations. 
We chose it because it provided a readily available way of assessing bandwidth. Using crowd-sourced 
speedtests as a source gives good first idea, but is surely not perfect. Differences in testing behavior, biases 
with regard to the proportion of testing of different technologies, and national market structures all affect 
the result. Discussions about a more reliable way of systematically collect bandwidth data have to be 
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intensified. Besides, bandwidth has two main dimensions to it: the installed capacity (much in the sense 
measured here) and effective traffic (the fraction of bandwidth effectively used) (Hilbert & López, 2012b). 
The first is a general condition sine qua non (measured here), while the second allows to detect differences 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure supply and demand.  
There are other, additional metrics that can be used to complement these two fundamental indicators. 
One still refers to subscriptions. While the traditional reliance on the number of subscriptions as main digital 
divide indicator has been the main subject of critique throughout this article, it still provides important 
insights. Without subscriptions, no bandwidth, and for some applications, bandwidth might also be less 
relevant than for others: the end justifies the (measurement) means (Hilbert, 2011). Technological progress 
toward the so-called internet of things (Atzori et al., 2010) might also once again increase the relevance of 
the number of subscriptions as indicator. Besides, Vicente & Gil-de-Bernabé (2010), for example, have 
added network latency as part of their broadband quality score. Following the argument of going beyond 
access and looking at usage patterns (van Dijk, 2005), others have started to complement broadband data 
with data about social media usage (Pick et al., 2015) and user skills (Lee et al., 2015). Just like the first 
subscription-driven stage of the digital divide was filled with very different and sometimes contradicting 
proposals for adequate ways of measuring ICT access (Minges, 2005), the second bandwidth-driven stage 
of the digital divide will still have to find an adequate way of measurement. Future research will have to 
reveal which aspects matter most (and for what). As in the past, this will include coarse-grained composite 
indexes (e.g. Minges, 2005), as well as fine-tuned application specific definitions of future outlooks on the 
digital divide (Hilbert, 2011). It was the goal of this article to contribute to the continuous evolution of the 
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